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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
selection of arbitrators, opined the court, the consolidation would be
prejudicial since the non-participating party would be precluded from
exercising its full rights under the arbitration agreement.
It is difficult to take issue with the reasoning of the court, which,
standing alone, is supported by sufficient precedent to warrant denial
of Met's petition.169 However, the court added:
[S]ince the enactment of the CPLR, arbitrations are no longer con-
sidered special proceedings (CPLR 7502) thus depriving the courts
of the statutory power, formerly authorized under the Civil
Practices [sic] Act, to consolidate arbitrations of controversies....
Just as arbitrations are no longer subject to consolidation, because
they are neither actions nor special proceedings, they surely are also
exempt from such procedural regulation by the courts ... , as
third party practice (CPLR 1007) or joinder of parties (CPLR
1001).170
It would seem that the court erred in reaching this conclusion. As
support for its lack of power to consolidate arbitrations under the
CPLR, the court relied upon the appellate division opinion in In re
Chariot Textiles Corp. 17 However, prior to the instant decision, the
Court of Appeals had reversed the Chariot case, 172 adopting the ap-
pellate division dissent 73 which held that the courts may still order
consolidations under CPLR 7502. The practitioner should therefore
avoid placing reliance upon the Met Food dictum. 74
CPLR 7502: Federal Arbitration Act is controlling in petition for a
stay of arbitration in maritime action.
In Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chemical Co.,175 the Ap-
pellate Division, First Department, was petitioned to stay an arbi-
tration demanded in connection with a contract for furnishing tankers
for the carriage of chemicals. The contract contained an arbitration
agreement and a provision incorporating certain sections of the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act,17 6 thereby providing for the discharge of
169 See, e.g., In re Symphony Fabrics Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 473, 229 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Ist
Dep't 1962), aft'd, 12 N.Y.2d 409, 190 N.E.2d 418, 240 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1963).
170 59 Misc. 2d at 501, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
171 21 App. Div. 2d 762, 250 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Ist Dep't 1964).
172 18 N.Y.2d 793, 221 N.E.2d 913, 275 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1966). See The Quarterly Survey
of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's L. R-v. 686, 704-05 (1969).
173 21 App. Div. 2d at 763, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 494 (dissenting opinion).
174 See In re Vigo Steamship Corp., 32 App. Div. 2d 10, 299 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1st Dep't
1969), where the court reached a result similar to that in Met Food by denying con-
solidation because substantial prejudice might occur. However, the Vigo court recognized
that such consolidations might otherwise be proper.
175 31 App. Div. 2d 372, 297 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (lst Dep't 1969).
17646 U.S.C. §§ 1363(6), 1304 & 1311 (1964).
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liability unless suit was brought within one year of delivery of the
goods. Claims were asserted after the one year limitation, and arbi-
tration of those claims was sought.
Under CPLR 7502(b), one may apply to stay arbitration if the
claims sought to be arbitrated have been barred by limitation of time.
This device allows the court to pass on the purported time limitation.
However, the Federal Arbitration Act 77 limits the court's inquiry to
two issues: (1) the making of the agreement for arbitration; and (2) the
failure to comply with it.' s Therefore, under federal law, the issue
of time limitation would properly be decided in arbitration. The court
was thus faced with the choice of applying either federal or state law
to determine whether arbitration should proceed.
The court held that the agreement and the provision for arbi-
tration constituted maritime contracts. Accordingly, the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, which applies to "any maritime transaction or . . . a
transaction involving commerce,"'1 79 was applicable. The petition to
stay arbitration was denied, and the issue of the time limitation was
therefore properly determinable in arbitration.
DoMEsTIc RELATIONS LAW
DRL § 215-c(a): Failure to file notice of commencement of divorce
action results in termination of temporary alimony.
Pursuant to DRL § 215-c(a), a plaintiff must file notice of com-
mencement of a divorce action with an appropriate conciliation bureau
within twenty-one days after the commencement of such action. If
this requirement is not met, the statute provides that the action shall
be deemed to be discontinued.
In Cooper v. Cooper, 80 the effects of the failure to comply with
this provision were examined. Plaintiff-wife had been awarded tempo-
rary alimony in her divorce action. However, she had neglected to file
the requisite notice, and her motion to permit a late filing was denied.
The court deemed the action discontinued and granted plaintiff leave
to file her action for divorce anew. Defendant thereafter discontinued
his temporary alimony payments, and plaintiff sought to punish him
for contempt in the instant action, contending that the award remained
effective even though the action had been discontinued.
The court summarily rejected plaintiff's contention stating that,
177 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
178 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 588 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
179 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
180 59 Misc. 2d 112, 298 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1969).
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